

# The President's Daily Brief

13 July 1973

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# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

13 July 1973

#### PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Argentina, President Campora and Vice President Solano Lima reportedly will resign today to make way for Juan Peron's formal assumption of power. (Page 1)

Cambodia's Prime Minister In Tam, exasperated by Lon Nol's failure to consult him or the cabinet on the recent peace initiative, is talking again about resigning. (Page 2)

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North Vietnam

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Cambodia

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South Vietnam is changing to a flexible policy toward states that recognize the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government. (Page 5)

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The NATO allies continue to express their concern that the US-Soviet agreement on preventing nuclear war may have detrimental implications for the Alliance. (Page 6)

As the Soviets approach talks on force reductions this fall, they seem particularly sensitive to charges that they have been building up their own forces. (Page 7)

The French (Page 8)

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### **ARGENTINA**

President Campora and Vice President Solano Lima reportedly will present their resignations to Congress today to make way for Juan Peron's formal assumption of power. A presidential succession bill has been prepared that will enable Congress to elect the 77-year-old Peron to the nation's top office.

Little opposition is likely to such a move. Peron is already acknowledged to be the government's principal policy maker and is regarded by both supporters and opponents as the one individual who can control the divergent Peronist forces and restore order. In recent meetings with the commanders of the three armed services, he appears to have enlisted military support for his return to power. Principal resistance to the change could come from the left, which sees Peron as generally conservative but Campora as susceptible to pressure.

Peron reportedly plans to form a government of national unity, and is considering offering the vice presidency to Ricardo Balbin, leader of the Radical Party. Placing Balbin in a post from which he might later accede to power could raise opposition within the Peronist movement but would considerably help Peron consolidate his position.

#### **CAMBODIA**

Prime Minister In Tam, exasperated by Lon Nol's failure to consult him or the cabinet on last week's peace initiative, is talking again about resigning.

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neither he nor fellow High Political Council member Cheng Heng had taken part in the formulation of the initiative, it cannot be considered official, and in his view it has little chance of success.

Equally galling to In Tam has been Lon Nol's unilateral delegation of authority over the military to Sirik Matak and his naming of Matak to preside over council meetings in the president's absence. In Tam clearly regards such moves as part of a continuing effort to isolate him from important government business.

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


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Hanoi has consistently refused to become involved in Cambodian negotiations, a position that parallels that of Peking. One reason could well be that as long as the Khmer insurgents have the military initiative, North Vietnam sees no reason to force the pace of negotiations. Moreover, the North Vietnamese probably believe they already have what is essential to them-a relatively free hand in eastern Cambodia--and they may estimate that the Communist situation will further improve.

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# CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM



President Thieu told a group of lower house deputies late last week that he would not intervene in Cambodia after the end of US bombing expected on August 15.

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said efforts to recruit ethnic Khmer residents for service in Cambodia had been unsuccessful because potential recruits are unwilling to fight in Cambodia without adequate air support.

Thieu said that in any possible peace-negotiations, the US will have to deal with Sihanouk. He said that a decision to return Sihanouk to power would be disadvantageous to Cambodia, South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

# SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese Government is changing to a flexible policy toward states that recognize the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government		25X1
(PRG).		25X <sup>-</sup>
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In the past, the South Vietnamese have cut ties with the dozen or so governments that recognized the PRG. Adoption of the new policy almost certainly caused anguish in Saigon, since by acquiescing in dual recognition, the Thieu government undermines its claim to be the only valid regime in the South. Foreign Minister Lam favors the flexible approach.

#### NATO

The allies continue to express their concern that the US-Soviet agreement on preventing nuclear war may have detrimental implications for the Alliance.

The chief of the Italian foreign ministry's NATO office said recently that the agreement appears to undercut NATO's strategy of flexible response. He thinks the US-Soviet agreement to consult prior to the use of nuclear weapons conflicts with a 1969 document, agreed to by the US, providing that NATO would decide the form, content, and timing of any message to be sent to an enemy concerning the allies' intention to initiate the tactical use of nuclear weapons.


West German Defense Minister Leber has argued along the same lines, although not in such specific terms. Belgian Prime Minister Leburton has remarked that he has no reservations about the agreement, but there are lingering doubts in the Belgian foreign office.

An Italian official claims that Western European representatives will soon meet in Brussels to analyze the agreement jointly.

#### **USSR**

Recent Western press reports that the USSR has been increasing the size of its military forces have provoked an unusual denial from Deputy Chief of Staff Ogarkov. On July 10, Red Star carried an interview in which General Ogarkov took issue with such reports. To support his case he referred to the constant defense budget of 17.9 billion rubles that the USSR has announced for each of the last four years.

As they approach talks on force reductions this fall, the Soviets seem particularly sensitive to charges that they have been building up their own forces. The figure cited by Ogarkov, of course, does not include all defense expenditures and can hardly be used to prove or disprove anything.



#### NOTES

Berlin: East Germany has begun to reject applications by West Berliners to visit East Berlin during the World Youth Festival (July 28 - August 5) to prevent West Berliners from disrupting the proceedings. Such attempts to impede movement run afoul of existing travel agreements, and West Berlin intends to protest. The East German move has come under strong criticism from West Berliners and West Germans who are already incensed at a shooting incident last week at the Wall. Neither side, however, is likely to allow the present controversy to bring on a serious confrontation.

Uruguay: The Bordaberry government has broken the 15-day general strike, but it has gained only a respite from labor disturbances fostered by the opposition. Militant union leaders reportedly are planning short strikes, work slowdowns, and occasional demonstrations to harass the government. If this strategy finds wide support, it could seriously disrupt economic recovery, which is an essential part of the program espoused by Bordaberry and his military backers.